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ABSTRACT
In her article, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes,
Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, Professor Joan Heminway notes that
efforts to guide the decision-making of corporate directors away from shareholder
wealth maximization are suspect, whether by way of charter, bylaw, shareholder
agreement, or board policy. This is because when board decision-making serves the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, or pursues corporate objectives with no
shareholder wealth benefits, directors run the risk of violating positive law or public
policy that prioritizes shareholder wealth maximization. Meanwhile, in his article,
The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, Professor Eric Chaffee presents what
he calls a new “essentialist” theory of the corporation, which he labels “collaboration
theory.” According to Professor Chaffee, this new theory explains why corporations
have a duty to act in socially responsible ways, except when to do so would obviously
destroy shareholder value.
In this Essay, I build on the aforementioned work of Professors Heminway and
Chaffee in order to analyze to what extent corporate personality theory, including
Professor Chaffee’s collaboration theory, has a role to play in determining the extent to
which for-profit corporations may use private ordering to limit the constraints of any
shareholder wealth maximization norm. Professor Heminway argues that there exists
uncertainty about the ability of corporate stakeholders to use private ordering in this
way, and the validity and enforceability of related bylaws, shareholder agreements, and
board policies is therefore in doubt. At the same time, courts and legislatures often rely
on theory and policy to resolve the existing uncertainty, and thus theory and policy may
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be decisive. In this Essay, I hope to show that corporate personality theory can be one
of the relevant theoretical tools that may be used to bring additional
clarity to this area.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance can be understood as encompassing the
theories, norms, and rules that determine (1) who decides how scarce
corporate resources will be allocated, and (2) what the goal of that
decision-making should be. Three of the most dominant theories of
corporate governance are director primacy, shareholder primacy, and
team production theory. 2 Director primacy is generally understood to
argue that the board of directors is the ultimate decision-maker, and that
the goal of the board’s decision-making should be shareholder wealth
maximization. 3 Meanwhile, shareholder primacy also (unsurprisingly)
favors shareholder wealth maximization as the goal, but argues that
shareholders should have more decision-making power than they
currently do. 4 Finally, team production theory aligns with director
primacy in locating decision-making power in the board, but conceives
of the goal as mediating the often conflicting interests of the various
corporate stakeholders in order to allow the corporation to optimally
fulfill its various obligations in an arguably sustainable way. 5
While two of these three dominant theories of corporate
governance identify shareholder wealth maximization as the goal of
See Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015) (discussing “three competing models of corporate governance:
director primacy, shareholder primacy, and team production”).
2

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U.L. REV. 547, 550 (2003).
3

4

See Padfield, supra note 2, at 11–13.

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247, 257–58 (1999); id. at 249 (“In this Article we take issue with both the
prevailing principal-agent model of the public corporation and the shareholder wealth
maximization goal that underlies it.”); id. at 253 (“[B]oards exist not to protect
shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members
of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and
possibly other groups, such as creditors.”).
5
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corporate governance, there is a surprising amount of disagreement
among corporate governance experts as to the extent to which boards
are actually subject to a duty to maximize shareholder value. 6 In her
article, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, Decisional
Law, and Organic Documents, Professor Joan Heminway reviews the
possible sources of such a duty, 7 and concludes that there is reason to be
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes,
Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 972 (2017).

6

See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 29
(2012) (denying the existence of a pervasive
shareholder wealth maximization norm); Lyman
Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby
Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10–15 (2015) (surveying
academic literature on the shareholder wealth
maximization norm and concluding that there is none);
Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization
and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 389, 393–99 (2014) (describing shareholder
wealth maximization as a norm of corporate
governance and an objective of corporate law);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in
the Convergence Debate, 16 Transnat'l LAW. 45, 45 (2002)
(describing the shareholder wealth maximization norm
as “well-established in U.S. corporate law” and treating
it “as given”).
Id. at 940 n.3.
In this Essay, I will speak of shareholder wealth maximization as a duty, rule, and
norm. For purposes of this Essay, I use these labels interchangeably. Cf. Heminway,
supra note 6, at 939 n.1 (2017) (discussing various definitions of “norm”/“norms”
including “a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or
legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions,” and “standards of behavior
defined in terms of rights and obligations” (first quoting JONATHAN R. MACEY,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 32–33 (2008), and
then quoting Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983))).
7
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suspicious about pronouncements that shareholder wealth maximization
is the dominant corporate governance norm. Nonetheless, she assumes
practitioners cannot ignore the evidence in favor of such a norm, and
proceeds to ask what forms of private ordering may be available to opt
out of it. Ultimately, Professor Heminway concludes that even here
there is a tremendous amount of uncertainty.
This Essay builds on Professor Heminway’s article by exploring
the extent to which corporate personality theory can be used to further
our understanding both of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in
general, and the extent to which parties may opt out of it. Corporate
personality theory tends to come up more frequently in discussions of
the government’s ability to regulate corporations, as opposed to
discussions of the allocation of power among the primary private
corporate stakeholders, which tends to be more the domain of corporate
governance. However, the lines between external regulation of
corporations and their internal affairs can quickly blur, 8 and this Essay
will argue, among other things, that corporate personality theory has a
role to play in the corporate governance debates surrounding
shareholder wealth maximization.
The three dominant theories of corporate personality are artificial
entity, aggregate, and real entity theory. 9 Generally speaking, artificial
entity theory views the corporation as a creature of the state, and tends
to presume the government has more power to regulate corporations
See Ann Lipton, Unicorn Governance and Power, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Oct. 14, 2017),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/10/unicorn-governance-andpower.html (noting that corporate governance obligations “placed on firms ostensibly
for the protection of investors have very tangible effects on employees, customers,
competitors, and general compliance with the rule of law” and that it “is not clear that
external regulation alone can carry this responsibility”).
8

Stefan J. Padfield, A New Social Contract: Corporate Personality Theory and the Death of the
Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 363, 373 (2017) (reviewing theories); Padfield,
supra note 2, at 20 (“I have sought in my recent scholarship to align the dominant
theories of corporate governance with the primary theories of corporate personality.”)
(citing Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory 66 OKLA. L. REV 327, 331
(2014); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign
Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 835 (2013); Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank
Corporation: More Than A Nexus-of-Contracts 114 W. VA. L. REV. 209, 215 (2011)).
9
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than either the aggregate or real entity theories, which tend to view the
corporation as standing more in private shoes – be that by way of the
shareholders under aggregate theory or the directors under real entity
theory. 10 In his article, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility,
Professor Eric Chaffee presents what he calls “a new essentialist theory
of the corporation,” which he terms “collaboration theory.” 11 According
to Professor Chaffee, this new theory “explains why the collaborating
parties have an obligation to manage the corporation in a way that is
socially responsible.” 12 In this Essay, I also will build on Professor
Chaffee’s article by applying his discussion of corporate personality
theory—including his collaboration theory—to the issue of corporations
opting out of shareholder wealth maximization.
Following this Introduction, Part II will review the evidence for
and against a shareholder wealth maximization norm, relying heavily on
Professor Heminway’s Shareholder Wealth Maximization article. Part III
will then lay out in more detail the various corporate personality theories,
this time relying heavily on Professor Chaffee’s Corporate Social
Responsibility article. Part IV will then seek to advance the discussion by
applying the corporate personality lessons to the issue of private ordering
around the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Ultimately, I offer
two conclusions. First, the corporate personality theories discussed can
be ranked in terms of their support for private ordering and opting out
of any shareholder wealth maximization norm, 13 and advocates on either
But cf. Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV.
353, 365 (2017) (“The work of German legal theorist Otto von Gierke played a key role
in the development of real entity theory. Gierke posited that groups have a ‘collective
spirit’ that gives them an identity separate and apart from the individuals composing
them.”).

10

11

Id. at 356.

12

Id.

One should generally expect that the more a particular theory of corporate
personality views the corporation as a private rather than a public construct, the more
freedom that theory should support granting to corporations to opt out of regulatory
13
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side of the debate risk ceding precious ground to their opponents if they
ignore these theories in the course of making their arguments. 14 Second,
collaboration theory, in particular, provides unique support for a
particular form of at least minimizing the constraints of shareholder
wealth maximization via private ordering without directly undermining
shareholder wealth maximization. 15 Finally, I will provide concluding
remarks in Part V.
default rules. Thus, one might rank the theories from most to least supportive of
private ordering as follows: (1) aggregate theory, (2) real entity theory, (3) collaboration
theory, and (4) artificial entity theory. Of course, context matters, and thus, for
example, collaboration theory might be more supportive of opting out of shareholder
wealth maximization due to its fundamental support of corporate social responsibility.
Cf. Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign
Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 833 (2013) (“Despite protestations to the
contrary, . . . a closer reading of the Citizens United opinion reveals that both the
majority and dissent not only adopted diverging theories of the corporation, but that
those theories were likely dispositive.”); id. at 857 (“[R]eview of the primary campaign
finance cases leading up to, and relied upon in, Citizens United should make clear that an
on-going debate about the nature of corporations has been central to the resolution of
these cases, despite the fact that none of the opinions have expressly referenced
corporate theory.”).
14

Specifically, the following guidelines, which Professor Chaffee argues necessarily flow
from collaboration theory, may form the basis of charter amendments and bylaws that
provide the greatest freedom to pursue social ends while not directly conflicting with
shareholder wealth maximization:
15

[B]eyond engaging in socially responsible behavior
when it supports profit maximization, those
organizing, operating, and owning corporations
should engage in such behavior in two additional
circumstances to fulfill their implied duty of good
faith. First, in instances in which the socially
responsible behavior neither financially benefits
nor financially harms the corporation, which
means it is cost neutral, the corporation should
engage in socially responsible behavior to fulfill
the implied duty of good faith within the
collaboration. Second, in instances in which the
financial benefit to the business entity is uncertain,
the corporation should engage in socially
responsible behavior to fulfill the implied duty of
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SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION

In her article, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of
Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, Professor Heminway tries
to locate the duty to maximize shareholder value in both statutory law
and court opinions. The following two sub-parts A and B will
summarize her findings, and provide some additional commentary. Subpart C will then review Professor Heminway’s discussion of the
likelihood that organic documents such as a corporation’s charter or
bylaws can provide an effective means of opting out of any duty to
maximize shareholder value.
A.

Statutes

In Professor Heminway’s survey of the relevant statutory law,
she found that none expressly codify a duty to maximize shareholder
value, 16 whether in provisions governing the charter’s statement of
purpose, 17 or in provisions setting forth director and officer standards of
Meanwhile, Professor Heminway identifies statutory
conduct. 18
good faith within the collaboration. Because the
future is often uncertain, this means that in many
instances corporations should engage in the
socially responsible course of action.
Chaffee, supra note 10, at 376.
16 Heminway, supra note 6, at 946. But cf. James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1598 (2013) (“[T]the American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles
of Corporate Governance declares that ‘a corporation . . . should have as its objective
the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain.’”) (quoting 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 2.01(a) (1994)).

Heminway, supra note 6, at 946 (“These state statutory provisions on corporate
charters, even with their differences, do not mandate or expressly invoke an emphasis
on shareholder wealth maximization or even shareholder value or primacy.”).
17

Id. at 947–48 (“These standards prescribe that actions be taken in good faith, with
due care, and in the best interest of the corporation. Yet, none of these statutory
frameworks regarding officer and director management or conduct mention—no less
18
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provisions that expressly disavow a corporate duty to maximize
shareholder wealth, such as constituency statutes. 19 Of course, the fact
that legislatures felt it necessary to promulgate such statutes at least
suggests they assumed a default shareholder wealth maximization norm
existed. The same could be said of benefit corporation statutes. 20
B.

Decisional Law

In the 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the Supreme Court of
Michigan famously asserted:
A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors
are to be employed for that end. The
require—management action in a manner that maximizes shareholder wealth or value
or compels shareholder primacy.”). But cf. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy
Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 285 (1998) (“‘[T]he best interests of the corporation’ are
generally understood to coincide with the best long-term interests of the
shareholders.”); COMM. ON CORP. LAWS, AM. BAR ASSOC., Other Constituencies Statutes:
Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2265 (1990) (“[T]he ‘best interests of the
corporation’ are equated with ‘corporate profit and shareholder gain.”’). The drafters’
intent when using “best interests of the corporation” may thus have been to create a
default rule in favor of shareholder wealth maximization, while maintaining the
flexibility to cover subsequent adjustments derived from other sources like constituency
statutes.
Heminway, supra note 6, at 948 (“[A] significant number of states have adopted ‘other
constituency’ legislation—statutes that emphasize management's ability to consider the
effects of corporate action on a variety of stakeholders.”); cf. id. at 949 (“Neither the
DGCL [Delaware General Corporation Law] nor the MBCA [Model Business
Corporation Act] includes other constituency provisions.”); Stephen Bainbridge, The
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Principle Versus Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012, 12:34 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-shareholder-wealth-maximizationprinciple-versus-non-shareholder-constituency-statutes.html (“[T]he shareholder wealth
maximization norm may survive even in states with nonshareholder constituency
statutes.”).
19

Heminway, supra note 6, at 949–50 (“One could argue that benefit corporation
statutes, which typically do not permit the corporation's board to prioritize shareholder
wealth over other corporate interests, have become popular largely because of concern
that a shareholder wealth maximization norm does exist . . .”).
20
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discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end,
and does not extend to a change in the
end itself, to the reduction of profits, or
to the nondistribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes. 21
Many years later, in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,
Chancellor Chandler, writing for the Court of Chancery of Delaware,
applied a similar principle when he held:
Having chosen a for-profit corporate
form, the craigslist directors are bound by
the fiduciary duties and standards that
accompany that form. Those standards
include acting to promote the value of the
corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the
company name has to mean at least that. 22
These are two of the cases most often cited as evidence of a
common law duty to maximize shareholder value. 23 According to a
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). It may be worth noting
here that identifying shareholder profit as the primary purpose of a for-profit
corporation does not preclude other secondary purposes.
21

EBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also id.
(“I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate
policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value
of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . .”).
22

Heminway, supra note 6, at 950–51 (“The list of judicial decisions that support
corporate shareholder wealth maximization is short and has been well trod in the
literature. Typically, summaries of the court opinions in this area begin with the iconic
early twentieth-century Michigan case Dodge v. Ford Motor Company and extend through
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, sometimes stopping along the way to note other
cases, including Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. and its progeny, and
perhaps another case or two, like Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.”); cf. Robert P. Bartlett, III,
23
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Westlaw search on August 12, 2017, Dodge has been cited in seventy-one
subsequent cases, with only two being characterized as providing a
“Negative Treatment” of Dodge. 24 Meanwhile, on the same date eBay was
reported as having been cited by thirty-one cases, with only one
providing negative treatment. 25 Furthermore, Professor Robert Rhee
recently conducted “the first empirical review of judicial discussion of
shareholder profit maximization in the era of the modern corporation,
the period 1900‒2016,” and found that “courts have pervasively
embraced the concept that corporate managers should maximize
shareholder wealth.” 26
One source of vigorous pushback on this point is the business
judgment rule, which allows boards to force plaintiffs to overcome a
judicially recognized presumption that the board acted in good faith, on
a fully informed basis, and in the best interests of the corporation. The
degree of discretion this grants boards is contested, 27 but it seems fair to
Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 255, 295
(2015) (“eBay and Trados . . . are in tension with long-standing doctrine concerning the
standard of conduct for Delaware directors.”); id. at 292 (citing In re Trados Inc. S'holder
Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 41 (Del. Ch. 2013)) (“generally it will be the duty of the board, where
discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of the common
stock—as the good faith judgment of the board sees them to be—to the interests
created by the special rights, preferences, etc . . . of preferred stock.”).
24

On file with author.

25

On file with author.

Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017).

26

Compare Stephen Bainbridge, Can Tim Cook Ignore ROI When Deciding How to Design an
iPhone?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 7, 2014, 8:46 AM), http://www.
professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/03/can-tim-cook-ignore-roiwhen-deciding-how-to-design-an-iphone.html (arguing that business judgement rule
limits courts to following questions: “Did the board commit fraud? Did the board
commit an illegal act? Did the board self-deal?”), with Stephen Bainbridge, Al Franken,
Shareholder
Wealth
Maximization,
and
the
Business
Judgment
Rule,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 27, 2010, 4:07 PM), http://www. professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/07/shareholder-wealth-maximization-andthe-business-judgment-rule.html (suggesting failure to advance the best interests of the
shareholders might constitute bad faith). It is this author’s belief that brazenly ignoring
ROI (return on investment) implicates not only good faith, but also the duty of care
27
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say that it at least makes it relatively easy for boards to avoid
accountability for ignoring any duty to maximize shareholder value by
simply appending a colorable pro-shareholder-value story to any action
taken. 28
(which requires a board to assess all material information reasonably available) as well as
the waste doctrine. Cf. Harwell Wells, The Life (and Death?) of Corporate Waste, 74 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2017) (“Respected judges have downplayed waste as a
‘vestige’ and described it as ‘possibly non-existent,’ the Loch Ness monster of corporate
law; but waste survives.”).
Cf. Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25
REGENT U.L. REV. 269, 285–86 (2013).
28

Judges address only the particular claims and desired
relief that are brought before them. They cannot and
do not mandate that governing officials maximize
shareholder wealth. They can only prohibit them from
taking particularized actions. In Dodge, the plaintiffs
sought more dividends. In eBay, the plaintiffs sought
the nullification of certain anti-takeover measures.
Neither plaintiff sought an injunction or other remedy
that would have prohibited directors from pursuing
the criticized business strategy, and neither the Dodge
nor the eBay court altered corporate strategy. For
judges who routinely recite the vaunted business
judgment rule, moreover, one core rationale for which
is that directors, not judges, govern corporations, the
granting of such extraordinary and meddlesome relief
would seem quite unlikely. Judges may be expressing
their views about a corporate purpose as they fashion
remedial relief, but they leave that purpose intact.
Moreover, the unelected judges in Delaware have
been, historically speaking, very reluctant to equate
corporate purpose with stockholder wealth, as the
turbulent takeover era of the 1980s revealed. In fact,
only when the demise of the corporation is at hand or
control over its direction shifts away from dispersed
shareholders does stockholder wealth become the sole
purpose.
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One case frequently cited in support of the preceding
proposition is Shlensky v. Wrigley, wherein the Appellate Court of Illinois
refused to impose liability on the board of the entity that owned the
Chicago Cubs for failing to install lights so that night games could be
played even though there was evidence that this caused the team to lose
money and the rationale for the decision was as contrary to shareholder
wealth maximization as Ford’s in the Dodge case:
Plaintiff . . . alleges that defendant Wrigley
has refused to install lights, not because
of interest in the welfare of the
corporation but because of his personal
opinions “that baseball is a ‘daytime sport’
and that the installation of lights and
night baseball games will have a
deteriorating effect upon the surrounding
neighborhood.” It is alleged that he has
admitted that he is not interested in
whether the Cubs would benefit
financially from such action because of
his concern for the neighborhood . . . . 29
The Shlensky court, however, concluded that “the decision is one
properly before directors and the motives alleged in the amended
complaint showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest in their
making of that decision.” 30 Thus, no liability would be imposed for
failing to install lights because, “[w]hile all the courts do not insist that
Id. A couple of points are likely worth making here. First, business strategy arguably
ultimately only matters in application. Thus, the fact that judges do not overturn broad
strategies is cold comfort to boards pondering a particular action. Second, the fact that
there exists a unique duty to maximize shareholder value in the context of a change-ofcontrol does not undermine a claim that a broader duty to maximize shareholder value
exists as well. Generally, a board should be able to sacrifice short-term shareholder
value in exchange for greater long-term shareholder value (in fact, one could argue it is
obligated to do so), and it is arguably only the option of pursuing such a tradeoff that is
limited by the change-of-control scenario.
29

Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).

30

Id. at 780.
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one or more of the three elements [of fraud, illegality or conflict of
interest] must be present for a stockholder's derivative action to lie,
nevertheless we feel that unless the conduct of the defendants at least
borders on one of the elements, the courts should not interfere.” 31
A California Court of Appeal later stated that, “Shlensky
interpreted Dodge to mean that ‘there must be fraud or a breach of that
good faith which directors are bound to exercise toward the stockholders
in order to justify the courts entering into the internal affairs of
corporations.’” 32 However, a few points are worth making here. First,
there is at least some reason to believe that Shlensky misinterpreted Dodge.
The Dodge court ruled that
[I]t is not within the lawful powers of a
board of directors to shape and conduct
the affairs of a corporation for the merely
incidental benefit of shareholders and for
the primary purpose of benefiting others,
and no one will contend that, if the
avowed purpose of the defendant
directors was to sacrifice the interests of
shareholders, it would not be the duty of
the courts to interfere. 33
This arguably states a much higher bar than limiting review to fraud,
illegality or conflict of interest.
Second, the Shlensky court felt the need to provide a shareholder
wealth maximization motive to support its conclusion:
[W]e are not satisfied that the motives
assigned to Philip K. Wrigley, and
31

Id.

Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 779–80).
32

33

Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
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through him to the other directors, are
contrary to the best interests of the
corporation and the stockholders. For
example, it appears to us that the effect
on the surrounding neighborhood might
well be considered by a director who was
considering the patrons who would or
would not attend the games if the park
were in a poor neighborhood.
Furthermore, the long run interest of the
corporation in its property value at
Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to
keep
the
neighborhood
from
34
deteriorating.
While this commentary is generally viewed as dicta, the fact that the
court felt it necessary to provide such a defense for the board at all is
telling.
Finally, a review of the language used by the Shlensky court in its
opinion reveals the relevant test is at least broader than fraud, illegality or
conflict of interest. By way of example, the Shlensky court says both that
“there must be fraud or a breach of that good faith which directors are bound
to exercise toward the stockholders,” 35 and that “unless the conduct of
the defendants at least borders on [fraud, illegality or conflict of interest],
the courts should not interfere.” 36 Certainly, an argument can be made,
in light of all the foregoing, that preferring non-shareholder interests to
shareholder wealth maximization “borders” on a traditional conflict of
interest, at least when not supported by a reasonable long-term
shareholder wealth maximization story. 37
34

Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780.

35

Id. at 779–80 (emphasis added).

36

Id. at 780 (emphasis added).

Cf. Susan Pace Hamill, Untangling the Mystery of Teaching Business Organizations, 59 ST.
LOUIS U.L.J. 793, 806 n.51 (2015) (“Because Henry Ford may have been trying to
thwart the Dodge brothers from competing with him when he refused to authorize
dividends, arguably this [Dodge] decision could have been overturned on the grounds of
37
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Another point of contention revolves around what to make of
courts’ predilection for speaking both in terms of duties “to the
corporation” as well as duties “to the corporation and its shareholders.” 38
As Professor Heminway notes, 39 Vice Chancellor Travis Laster has
recently explained the distinction as follows:
[B]y increasing the value of the
corporation, the directors increase the
share of value available for the residual
claimants. Judicial opinions therefore
often refer to directors owing fiduciary
duties “to the corporation and its
shareholders.” This formulation captures
the foundational relationship in which
directors owe duties to the corporation
for the ultimate benefit of the entity's
residual
claimants.
Nevertheless,
“stockholders' best interest must always,
within legal limits, be the end. Other

a conflict of interest.”); Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation As the Adoption of Ends,
56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 144 (2008). (“In deciding whether the business judgment rule
applied, the [Shlensky] court was forced to assess Wrigley's motives. Was he out for the
corporation or was he out for himself? If the latter were the case, Wrigley would have a
conflict of interest with the shareholders and the business judgment rule would not
protect him.”).
See Heminway, supra note 6, at, 952–53 (2017) (“Adding to the complexity is some
doctrinal confusion--or perhaps just a lack of clear expression--in decisional law about
the institution or constituencies to which or whom director and officer fiduciary duties
are owed. Some decisional law describes fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and
other court opinions refer to duties owed to the corporation and its shareholders.
Although anecdotal observation reveals that the latter cases may predominate more in
change-of-control settings (where shareholder value primacy plays a more leading role),
the shareholder beneficiary language also occurs in other settings.”).

38

39

See id. at 953.
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constituencies may be considered only
instrumentally to advance that end.” 40
Professor Heminway has noted elsewhere that most frequently,
“courts find that the duties owed to the corporation operate for the
primary benefit of shareholders, as the corporation's owners and, more
specifically, for the financial benefit of shareholders. Yet even this
formulation is ambiguous, since shareholders are not a monolithic
group.” 41 However, the heterogeneity of shareholders may actually
support a shareholder wealth maximization norm. Given expected
differences in preferences, shareholders should arguably prefer the
managers of their investments in for-profit corporations to maximize the
return on those investments, which will then maximize the ability of the
shareholders to use their newfound wealth for whatever idiosyncratic
purposes they desire.
Professor Robert Rhee has listed some additional arguments
against a duty to shareholders, at least one that rests on par with, if not
superior to, a duty to the corporation.
Courts have frequently commented that “the
directors owe fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty to the corporation and its
shareholders.” This formulation implies that
the duty owed to shareholders ranks pari passu
with that owed to the corporation. But this is
not the case. The board's duty to the
corporation is unwavering and unqualified, but
its duty to shareholders is not so absolute. For
example, in takeovers, actual shareholder
preference is no basis to impose liability if the
board disagrees with it. In insolvency, the
In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 99; Leo E. Stine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle
with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147 n.
34 (2012)).
40

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Women in the Crowd of Corporate Directors: Following, Walking
Alone, and Meaningfully Contributing, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 59, 74 (2014).
41

2017]

THE ROLE OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY THEORY

431

board's fiduciary duty is no longer to
shareholders, but pivots to creditors. When
shareholders threaten the interest of the
corporation, the board may take hostile
actions against them to advance the
corporation's interest. Ultimately, directors
owe their fiduciary duty to the corporation as
a legal entity. Shareholders are one group of
multiple constituencies, including creditors,
employees, customers, and suppliers, and by
virtue of their residual claim they best stand to
represent the corporation's interest in a
derivative suit. Thus, we can say that the duty
running from a director to the shareholder is
not direct, but flows through the corporation.
The linearity of the contractual nexus among
the board, the corporation, and the
shareholder is important from the standpoint
of legal duty. A quick review of seminal cases
in tort law shows that the lack of a direct
contractual privity precludes the finding of
duty. 42
It may be worth addressing these points in turn. First, Professor
Rhee states that “in takeovers, actual shareholder preference is no basis
to impose liability if the board disagrees with it.” In support of this
proposition, Professor Rhee cites Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time
Inc., wherein the court stated the following: “That many, presumably
most, shareholders would prefer the board to do otherwise than it has
done does not . . . afford a basis to interfere with the effectuation of the

Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1139, 1183–84 (2013) (quoting Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994)).
42
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board's business judgment.” 43 However, Time may be better understood
as empowering the board to pursue long-term shareholder wealth
maximization even when the shareholders would prefer a transaction
increasing their wealth in the present. 44 This change in perspective
matters because it upholds, rather than undermines, a duty to
shareholders. The duty is not to prioritize their preferences without
qualification. Rather, the duty is to maximize their wealth. Thus, rather
than concluding that the duty to shareholders is weaker than the duty to
the corporation, we conclude that the duty to shareholders remains
primary. Arguably supporting this view, in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
v. Airgas, Inc., Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery
relied on evidence that “a large number—if not all—of the arbitrageurs
who bought into Airgas's stock at prices significantly below the $70 offer
price would be happy to tender their shares at that price regardless of the
potential long-term value of the company” to justify a board’s defensive
measures under Time because otherwise the shareholders would “take a
smaller harvest in the swelter of August over a larger one in Indian
Summer.” 45
Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc , Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935, 1989 WL
79880, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
43

Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and
the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 951 (1988) (“[W]e need some
anchoring point upon which to rest a theoretical foundation. One approach that others
have suggested utilizes a hypothetical bargaining game. To do this, one asks: What
would rational shareholders have agreed upon in a world of low transaction costs?
What rules would they reach as to self-dealing, permissible takeover defensive tactics, or
due care liability? My own guess is that the rules they would reach would pretty closely
approximate the existing law of fiduciary duties with respect to self-dealing, but might
be quite different with respect to due care liability and takeover defensive tactics.”);
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real About Corporate Social Responsibility: A Reply to Professor
Greenfield, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645, 650 (2002) (“[B]y and large, courts have not
scrutinized business decisions to see whether directors sacrificed profit maximization to
advance the interests of employees, creditors, customers, and the community. Instead,
the courts almost invariably accept some rationale as to how the business decisions
were in the long-range interest of the shareholders.”).
44

Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 111 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“The next
question is, if a majority of stockholders want to tender into an inadequately priced
offer, is that substantive coercion? Is that a threat that justifies continued maintenance
45
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Second, Professor Rhee states that in insolvency, “the board's
fiduciary duty is no longer to shareholders, but pivots to creditors.” 46 Of
course, by definition the shares of an insolvent company should be
worthless, so directing management to not also leave the corporation’s
creditors with nothing does not necessarily undercut a shareholder
wealth maximization duty outside insolvency.
Third, we are told that when shareholders “threaten the interest
of the corporation, the board may take hostile actions against them to
advance the corporation's interest.” 47 The case cited to support this
proposition is Orban v. Field. 48 On this point, it may be worth reviewing
some relevant commentary from Chancellor Laster in Trados:
Some scholars have interpreted Orban v. Field,
1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997)
(Allen, C.), as supporting a “controlcontingent approach” in which a board
elected by the common stock owes duties to
the common stockholders but not the
preferred stock, but a board elected by the
of the poison pill? Put differently, is there evidence in the record that Airgas
stockholders are so ‘focused on the short-term’ that they would ‘take a smaller harvest
in the swelter of August over a larger one in Indian Summer’?”) (quoting Mercier v.
Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 815 (Del. Ch. 2007)). Complicating matters,
when one takes into account rate of return in addition to stock price, one may find that
the short-term preference expressed by shareholders in these cases may in fact also be
maximizing their value in terms of rate of return, even assuming a higher stock price
later. This certainly makes more sense from the perspective of rational actor theory,
but it also weakens the justification for finding the relevant coercion to uphold a
board’s defensive measures. Nonetheless, this complication is arguably more about
application of the duty to maximize shareholder value, as opposed to a change in that
duty. My thanks to Professor Rhee for this insight.
46

Rhee, supra note 43, at 1183.

47

Id.

48

Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997).
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preferred stock can promote the interests of
the preferred stock at the expense of the
common stock. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried &
Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967,
990–93 (2006) . . . . The control-contingent
interpretation does not comport with how I
understand the role of fiduciary duties or the
ruling in Orban, which I read as a case in
which the common stock had no economic
value such that a transaction in which the
common stockholders received nothing was
fair to them. 49
Thus, to the extent the relevant conflict is between shareholder wealth
maximization and corporate survival in Orban, the preference for
corporate survival does not necessarily undermine shareholder wealth
maximization. 50
Finally, Professor Rhee concludes that “[a] quick review of
seminal cases in tort law shows that the lack of a direct contractual
privity precludes the finding of duty.” 51 However, Proessor Rhee makes
clear in the beginning of his article that he is not arguing that “a breach

49

In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 42 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2013).

But cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think
Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1 (2010) (“I believe that the generation of durable wealth for
its stockholders through fundamentally sound economic activity, such as the sale of
useful products and services, is the primary goal of the for-profit corporation.”)
(emphasis added).
50

51

Rhee, supra note 43, at 1184.
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of fiduciary duty is a tort,” 52 and lack of a duty under tort law does not
preclude a fiduciary duty. 53 As Professor Salar Ghahramani has noted:
The breach of these duties – which could
be caused by conflict of interest or gross
negligence – is treated as an equitable wrong,
as opposed to the legal wrongs of tort,
breach of contract, or the breach of a
statutory obligation. The distinction matters
not only because of the different remedial
regimes that are triggered under law and
equity, but also because tortious claims, as
common law civil wrongs, guaranteed a jury
trial under the unincorporated Seventh
Amendment, while breach of fiduciary duty
claims generally carry no such protection
when invoked as actions in equity. 54
Id. at 1142 (“To be clear, I do not argue that a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort, just
the way it is not a breach of contract, notwithstanding the contractarian view of
corporate governance.”).
52

Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874, cmt. b (1979) (“A fiduciary who
commits a breach of his duty as a fiduciary is guilty of tortious conduct to the person
for whom he should act.”) and Long v. Lowe’s Companies., Inc., No. 6:16–cv–00932–
AA 2017 WL 1217155, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2017) (“[F]iduciary duties ring in tort and
arise out of common law, regardless of defendants’ corporate form.”) with Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370 (Del. 1993) (“The tort principles of Barnes have
no place in a business judgment rule standard of review analysis.”) (citing Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y.1924)) and MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, No. 4521-CC,
2010 WL 1782271, at *12 n.68 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (“Fiduciary duties exist
independent of tort obligations.”); see also J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris,
Breaches of Fiduciary Duty and the Delaware Uniform Contribution Act, 11 DEL. L. REV. 71, 71
(2010) (“We conclude that a breach of a fiduciary duty is in fact a tort, although a
unique species historically called an ‘equitable tort.’”).
53

Salar Ghahramani, Professors as Corporate Fiduciaries: Implications for Law, Organizational
Ethics, and Public Policy, 10 VA. L. & Bus. Rev. 237, 246–47 (2016).

54
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Ultimately, the issue here is whether corporate directors are subject to a
duty to maximize shareholder value and, if so, whether that duty is
subordinate to a distinct duty to the corporation. Meanwhile, Professor
Rhee’s goal in the article discussed above is to answer the question: “If
there was no corporation law of fiduciary duty of care and tort law
applied instead, what would the legal framework of a director's duty and
standard of liability look like?” 55 Thus, we may at least conclude for now
that the result of such a thought experiment may well be a diminished
duty to shareholders, but current law has not reached that conclusion.
Returning to the general question before us here, it is also worth
noting that to “economically oriented corporate law professors,
distinguishing between directors’ fiduciary duty to shareholders and a
duty to the corporation itself smacks of reification – treating the fictional
corporate entity as if it were a real thing.” 56 Reification of the
corporation is contrary to the popular contractarian view of the firm, and
the issue implicates corporate personality theory, which will be discussed
further below. Suffice it to say for now that while a foolish consistency
may be the “hobgoblin of little minds,” 57 the foregoing at least suggests
that proponents of shareholder wealth maximization should align
themselves with associational conceptions of corporate personhood,
rather than conceptions distinguishing the corporate entity from its
owners/shareholders. 58 In other words, to the extent a duty to the

55

Rhee, supra note 43, at 1142.

Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 879, 895 n.86 (2012).
56

57

RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self Reliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES (1841).

Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 547–48 (2003) (“[T]he ‘nexus of contracts' or
‘contractarian’ model . . . denies that shareholders own the corporation. Instead, it
argues that shareholders are merely one of many factors of production bound together
in a complex web of explicit and implicit contracts. Contractarian theory nevertheless
continues to treat directors and officers as contractual agents of the shareholders, with
fiduciary obligations to maximize shareholder wealth.”).
58
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corporation is held out as competing with a duty to shareholders, the
fictional nature of corporations undermines the claim. 59
Near the end of this section of her paper, Professor Heminway
concludes that, “[t]o derive a single, broadly applicable norm or rule of
law on shareholder wealth maximization from these decisions likely
would be reckless.” 60 Furthermore, “it would be over-claiming to assert
that U.S. state decisional law–any more than U.S. state statutory law–
articulates a clear, legally enforceable shareholder wealth maximization
norm as a matter of substantive corporate doctrine.” 61 Yet, in what
jurisdiction would an attorney advise his or her client to proceed as
Henry Ford did in the Dodge case? 62 Putting aside constituency statutes 63
(and courts that provide shareholder wealth maximization stories for
defendants before them), I doubt anyone experienced in these matters
would risk money that mattered to them retrying the Dodge case on
behalf of Ford. So long as we define shareholder wealth maximization
more broadly than short-term shareholder wealth maximization, as I
believe we should, 64 the idea that any practicing lawyer would be
Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 n.2 (1981) (“In the
thirteenth century Pope Innocent IV forbade the practice of excommunicating
corporations on the unassailable logic that, since the corporation had no soul, it could
not lose one.”).
59

60

Heminway, supra note 6, at 954.

61

Id. at 955.

Cf. Stephen Bainbridge, Is Dodge v Ford Motor Company a Close
Corporation/Controlling Shareholder Case?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012,
12:07 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/
is-dodge-v-ford-motor-company-a-close-corporationcontrolling-shareholder-case.html
(“[T]he court’s own analysis in Dodge is not limited to close corporations.”).
62

Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 19 (“[T]he shareholder wealth maximization norm may
survive even in states with nonshareholder constituency statutes.”).
63

Cf. Tim Hodgson, The Search for a Long-Term Premium, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 17, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/07/17/the-search-for-a-long-term-premium/ (“Our conclusion is that a sizeable
64
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uncertain of the outcome in a case where the board admitted to
destroying shareholder value in pursuit of some other goal strikes me as
unlikely. 65 Of course, Professor Heminway acknowledges all this, but
she views it as a “persistent common perception” rather than a rule of
law. 66 I would argue that the perception is so persistent and common
that it is law. 67
C.

Organic Documents

Assuming that the default rule of corporate governance is
shareholder wealth maximization, can parties opt out? At first blush, it

net long-term premium does exist, and we have quantified its size as lying between
0.5% to 1.5% per annum (pa), depending on an investors’ size and governance
arrangements.”). But cf., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 35–36 (1991) (“[W]hat is the goal of the
corporation? . . . Our response . . . is: who cares? If the New York Times is formed to
publish a newspaper first and make a profit second . . . . Those who came in at the
beginning consented, and those who came later bought stock the price of which
reflected the corporation's tempered commitment to a profit objective.”).
Cf. Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the
Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 875 (2013) (“It is axiomatic
that directors of a corporation are fiduciaries of its shareholders under federal insider
trading law . . . .”).
65

Heminway, supra note 6, at 955–56 (‘“Despite all of the academic debate, the persistent
common perception seems to be that directorial duties require placing shareholder wealth at
the forefront. . . .’ [and] it impacts the advice that a lawyer gives to a corporate client
when the client's board is meeting to engage in decision making or oversight.”) (quoting
J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2012)).
66

67 Cf. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 752 (2005) (quoting
Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive
Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1059–60 (2001)) (“Since as early as
sixteenth-century England, the common law has drawn duties ‘from pre-judicial
community-defined obligations, based on the accepted coordination norms of the
community.’”).
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would seem that a charter provision should be effective, 68 but at least
some have argued that policy considerations may block such plans.
On the one hand, Professor David Yosifon has noted that:
The Delaware common law that has
established shareholder primacy as the
default governance rule for business
corporations neither states nor implies any
public policy indicating that the rule should
be unalterable by charter provision. Neither
does there seem to be a clearly implied
policy of the General Corporation Law to
prohibit alteration of the shareholder
primacy rule in firm governance. 69
In addition, as Professor Heminway notes, “corporations have, in the
past (during the takeover heyday of the mid-1980s), ‘adopted charter
provisions specifying management's right to consider the interests of
nonshareholder constituencies.’” 70
On the other hand, Chancellor Chandler's comments in the eBay
decision suggest that “there is little room for private ordering around the
shareholder wealth maximization norm in Delaware corporations that
attract outside investment.” 71 Specifically, Chancellor Chandler noted
that:
Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 67, at 36 (“If the New York Times is
formed to publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should be
allowed to object. Those who came in at the beginning consented, and those who came
later bought stock the price of which reflected the corporation’s tempered commitment
to a profit objective.”).

68

David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit Corporation
Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 479 (2017).
69

Heminway, supra note 6, at 958 (quoting Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age
of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 41 (1987)).
70

71

Heminway, supra note 6, at 959.
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The corporate form . . . is not an
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic
ends, at least not when there are other
stockholders interested in realizing a return
on their investment. . . . Thus, I cannot
accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that
specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not
to maximize the economic value of a forprofit Delaware corporation for the benefit
of its stockholders . . . . 72
Of course, “purely philanthropic ends” and shareholder wealth
maximization aren’t the only two options.
Shareholder wealth
maximization does not preclude pursuing philanthropic ends, 73 and one
can imagine situations where ignoring philanthropic ends would actually
preclude maximizing shareholder value.
In addition, Chancellor
Chandler’s recognition that if the decision-makers in eBay “were the only
stockholders affected by their decisions, then there would be no one to
object” 74 suggests that at least a unanimously adopted charter
amendment opting out of shareholder wealth maximization would
succeed. 75 Finally, the requirement that a policy must “specifically,
clearly, and admittedly seek[] not to maximize the economic value of a
for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders” in
72

eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d at 34.

73 Cf. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del.
1986) (“[C]oncern for various corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a
takeover threat, [provided] that . . . there be some rationally related benefit accruing to
the stockholders.”); A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 584 (1953) (“In many
instances [charitable] contributions have been sustained by the courts within the
common-law doctrine upon liberal findings that the donations tended reasonably to
promote the corporate objectives.”).
74

eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d at 34.

Cf. Heminway, supra note 6, at 960 (“Observers may wonder whether these words
from the Chancellor in and about the eBay opinion can be taken or may be used to
mean that a Delaware corporation must adopt any corporate policy or initiative that
contravenes the shareholder wealth maximization norm ab initio or with unanimous
shareholder approval.”).
75
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order to run afoul of the duty to maximize shareholder wealth reminds
us how rare cases like eBay and Dodge should be, given how relatively easy
it is to provide a shareholder wealth maximization rationale for most
corporate actions, which suggests only the most extreme forms of opting
out of shareholder wealth maximization should fail.
Professor Heminway also cites Chief Justice Strine as giving
“credence to the possibility that a charter provision could successfully
agree around the shareholder wealth maximization norm,” but “his
words are less than certain.” 76 Specifically, Chief Justice Strine has
remarked that: “It may well be the case that a certificate of incorporation
that said that a for-profit corporation would put other constituencies’
interests on par with stockholders would, in view of § 101(b) [which
allows a corporation to pursue any lawful purpose], be respected and
supersede the corporate common law.” 77
The openings for opting out of shareholder wealth maximization
via charter provisions just discussed receive further pushback from those
who argue that shareholder wealth maximization is a policy of the state,
at least in Delaware, that trumps otherwise recognized avenues for
private ordering. For example, Professor Stephen Bainbridge has noted
that:
[S]tate law arguably does not permit
corporate organic documents to redefine
the directors' fiduciary duties. In general,
a charter amendment may not derogate
from common law rules if doing so
conflicts with some settled public policy.
In light of the well-settled shareholder
wealth maximization policy, nonmonetary
76

Id. at 962.

Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 783 (2015).
77
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factors charter amendments therefore
appear vulnerable. 78
Professor Heminway notes that policy considerations created sufficient
judicial hostility to private ordering around board management that it
required legislative action to validate shareholder agreements to that
end, 79 and in this case the legislative response may already have been
issued in the form of benefit corporations. 80
It is worth repeating here that at least some of the shareholder
wealth implications of benefit corporations may be over-stated. For
example, Professor Heminway quotes a student note wherein it is
claimed that:
States, by creating benefit corporations, . .
. are . . . unnecessarily reinforcing current
beliefs by establishing a dichotomy in
which there are only two entities: (1)
regular corporations, which cannot take
into consideration social factors and must
maximize shareholder wealth; and (2)
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV.
971, 985 (1992); cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 547, 575–77 (2003) (“[S]hareholder wealth
maximization is not only the law, but also is a basic feature of corporate ideology.”).

78

Heminway, supra note 6, at 960–61, at (“A hostile judicial reaction of this kind to
corporate private ordering is reminiscent of the judicial reception to shareholder
agreements before statutes expressly validated them as a means of agreeing around the
directors' managerial authority over the corporation.”).

79

See id. at 963–64 (“Two additional factors provide a cause for pause in endorsing the
validity of charter-based private ordering relating to the shareholder wealth
maximization norm. The first is the State of California's repeated rejection of a
corporate charter provision that included a social purpose clause …. The second
additional factor that may affect the validity of charter-based private ordering that is
determined to be inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm is the
legislative adoption of benefit corporations and other statutory forms of social
enterprise entity.”); cf. id. at 964 (“The only saving grace, although perhaps it provides
little comfort, is that benefit corporation statutes typically include a provision
disclaiming any effect of benefit corporation statutes on the validity or interpretation of
the for-profit corporate law outside the benefit corporation context.”).
80
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benefit corporations, which can take into
consideration social factors and do not
have to maximize shareholder wealth. 81
However, it is incorrect to say that “regular corporations … cannot take
into consideration social factors” because social factors impact the
shareholder wealth analysis, and not always negatively. In fact, in
determining the best path to maximizing shareholder value, corporations
arguably must consider social factors in order to satisfy their duty of care
to become informed of all material information reasonably available.
The only thing a for-profit corporation cannot do in a shareholder
wealth maximization regime is knowingly sacrifice shareholder value,
whether calculated in the short- or long-term, in pursuit of some social
end.
Professor Heminway concludes that “[t]he accumulated evidence
is at best unclear about whether a public or private firm incorporated in
or outside Delaware can engage in private ordering in its charter to
include a corporate purpose that may be interpreted in a manner
inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm.” 82
Furthermore, “[g]iven this uncertainty about charter-based private
ordering, prospects for the validity and enforceability of corporate
bylaws, shareholder agreements, and board policies also may be in
doubt.” 83 Thus, the debate continues, and this opens the door for
corporate personality theory to play a role.
Id. (quoting Jessica Chu, Note, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth
of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 185–86 (2012)).
81

82

Id. at 966.

Id. at 967; cf Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate
“Contracts”, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sep. 11, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/11/forum-selection-provisions-incorporate-contracts/ (“Treating corporate charter and bylaw forum-terms as a matter
of ordinary contract doctrine is neither logical nor justified. While there is a family
resemblance, a corporation’s charter and bylaws are no ordinary contracts. Rather, they
are hybrid legal structures that provide a mechanism for collective choice in the context
83
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CORPORATE PERSONALITY THEORY

Corporate personhood addresses when corporations should be
treated as persons under applicable law.
Assuming corporate
personhood, corporate personality theory addresses what type of person
the corporation should be treated as. The traditional theories of
corporate personality are: (1) artificial entity or concession theory, (2)
aggregate or contractarian theory, and (3) real entity theory. 84 Professor
Eric Chaffee has recently argued for a fourth theory: collaboration
theory. According to Professor Chaffee, collaboration theory is “a new
theory of the corporation that . . . mandates that corporations engage in
socially responsible behavior.” 85 The following sub-parts will explain the
differences between these four theories, as well as examine the argument
that corporate personality theories are too indeterminate to form the
basis for legal analysis. This will lay the foundation for exploring how
corporate personality theory may inform the debate about the
shareholder wealth maximization norm, as well as attempts to opt out of
the norm via private ordering.
A.

Artificial Entity / Concession Theory

Artificial entity theory (also known as concession theory) is
typically associated with the famous description of corporations
delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall in the 1819 case of Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward:
A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it, either expressly,
or as incidental to its very existence.
of substantial state regulation and straddle the public-private divide in ways that make
them quite dissimilar from ordinary contracts.”).
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformation of the Corporate Form: A
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 767 (2005).
84

85

Chaffee, supra note 10, at 357.

2017]

THE ROLE OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY THEORY

445

These are such as are supposed best
calculated to effect the object for which it
was created . . . . The objects for which a
corporation is created are universally such
as the government wishes to promote.
They are deemed beneficial to the
country; and this benefit constitutes the
consideration, and in most cases, the sole
consideration of the grant. 86
As can be surmised from the foregoing, concession theory tends to take
a broad view of the government’s ability to regulate corporations, and
views the corporation as standing more on the public, rather than
private, side of citizen/state divide – at least as compared to other
theories of the corporation. 87
B.

Aggregate / Contractarian Theory

As I have written elsewhere, “[t]he aggregate view rejected the
fiction of the corporation as an artificial entity, which had been
promoted by concession theory, and instead focused on the property
rights of the underlying shareholders to conceive of the corporation as
simply an association of individuals.” 88 It places the corporation squarely
on the private side of the citizen/state divide, and supports granting
corporations many of the same rights to resist government regulation as
natural persons. The aggregate view is typically associated with the

86

Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636–37 (1819).

See generally Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327,
342–43 (2014) (addressing “four arguments frequently advanced to undermine
concession theory,” and arguing that “none of these arguments creates an
insurmountable obstacle for the application of concession theory”).

87

Stefan J. Padfield, A New Social Contract: Corporate Personality Theory and the Death of the
Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 363, 374 (2017).
88
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modern nexus-of-contracts (or contractarian) view of the firm. 89
However, by viewing the corporation as nothing more than an
association of individuals, aggregate theory risks undermining the
theoretical justification for granting shareholders limited liability when it
comes to the debts of the corporation. Real entity theory, which is
discussed next, may be viewed as a solution to this problem.
See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 819–22 (1999) (describing
the history and limitations of the nexus of contracts conception):
89

In 1976 Michael Jensen and William Meckling first
formulated the conception that the corporation is
a nexus of contracts . . . . Since that time, the
conception has dominated the law-and-economics
literature in corporate law . . . . [T]he intellectual
history of . . . Jensen and Meckling . . . begins with
Ronald Coase[] . . . [who] characterized the
boundaries of the firm as the range of exchanges
over which the market system was superseded and
resource allocation was accomplished instead by
authority and direction . . . . Armen Alchian and
Harold Demsetz objected to the Coasian
conception of the firm, and emphasized instead
the role of team production within the firm and
the role of agreement and monitoring in team
production . . . . Jensen and Meckling applauded
Alchian and Demsetz's objection to Coase's
theory of the firm, but concluded that Alchian and
Demsetz had not gone far enough in rejecting
Coase . . . . [Jensen and Meckling] therefore
substituted, for Coase's conception of the firm,
the competing conception that the firm was a
nexus of contracts--and, more particularly, “that
most organizations are simply legal fictions which
serve as a nexus for a set of contracting
relationships among individuals . . . .”
(internal footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
310 (1976) (citing R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972))).
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Real / Natural Entity Theory

By positing a “real” (as opposed to artificial), non-governmental
entity standing between shareholders and the state, real entity theory can
be understood as a solution to the problem of possibly undermining
limited liability with aggregate theory, while still providing a strong
bulwark against regulation. 90 Professor Chaffee notes:
The work of German legal theorist Otto
von Gierke played a key role in the
development of real entity theory. Gierke
posited that groups have a “collective
spirit” that gives them an identity separate
and apart from the individuals composing
them. Therefore, according to Gierke,
when individuals unite, including to
organize, operate, and own corporations,
a real entity is created that is independent
and distinct. 91
If collective spirits seem a bit too nebulous for a theory of corporations,
one might also consider the board of directors as constituting the real
entity, 92 similar to how the shareholders constitute the aggregate in at
least some versions of contractarian theory. 93
90 Cf. John C. Coates IV, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old
Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 823 (1989) (“[T]he natural entity theory developed as
certain aspects of corporate practice began to bring into question the adequacy of the
aggregate theory, which had dominated the law during the mid- to late-nineteenth
century.”); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 221 (1985) (“The main effect of the natural entity theory of the
business corporation was to legitimate large scale enterprise and to destroy any special
basis for state regulation of the corporation that derived from its creation by the
state.”).
91

Chaffee, supra note 10, at 365.

92

Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
NW. U. L. REV. 547, 560 (2003) (“[T]o the limited extent to which the corporation is
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Collaboration Theory

Professor Chaffee’s collaboration theory views the corporation as
similar to a joint venture or partnership to the extent that “the state and
the individuals organizing, operating, and owning a corporation are
collaborating within the corporate form, i.e., they are ‘[j]oint adventurers’
within the contractual relationship that generates the corporation.” 94
This characterization differentiates collaboration theory by imposing a
requirement that corporations seek pro-social ends whenever the
expected value of a transaction is unknowable or the contemplated prosocial action is shareholder wealth neutral. 95 This is necessary to fulfill
the obligation of good faith imposed on joint-venturers. 96
From the perspective of those seeking to advance the cause of
corporate social responsibility, collaboration theory may offer the best
properly understood as a real entity, it is the board of directors that personifies the
corporate entity.”).
93 Of course, identifying the board with the real entity of the corporation creates
potential problems from a governance perspective to the extent a duty corporation
becomes a board’s duty to itself.
94

Chaffee, supra note 10, at 374.

95Id. at 376 (“[B]eyond engaging in socially responsible behavior when it supports profit
maximization, those organizing, operating, and owning corporations should engage in
such behavior in two additional circumstances to fulfill their implied duty of good faith.
First, in instances in which the socially responsible behavior neither financially benefits
nor financially harms the corporation, which means it is cost neutral, the corporation
should engage in socially responsible behavior to fulfill the implied duty of good faith
within the collaboration. Second, in instances in which the financial benefit to the
business entity is uncertain, the corporation should engage in socially responsible
behavior to fulfill the implied duty of good faith within the collaboration.”).

Id. at 375–76. (“[I]ndividuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation are
required to treat the state government well, i.e., with good faith, because these parties
have agreed to collaborate. Exploring what ‘treating the state government well’ means,
in a democracy, the government is supposed to represent the will of the people, which
can be interpreted as the will of society because society is the aggregate of the people.
Although debatable, one can assume that society wants to be treated in a way that
supports its well-being, i.e., in a way that is socially responsible. Thus, when not seeking
profit maximization, those organizing, operating, and owning corporations should
engage in socially responsible behavior.”).
96
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hope when it comes to theories of corporate personhood. This is
because, while the social responsibility of the corporation depends on the
predilections of the owners, board, or state under aggregate, real entity,
or concession theory respectively, collaboration theory has social
responsibility built into its framework.
E.

Indeterminacy

In 1926, John Dewey published The Historic Background of Corporate
Legal Personality, wherein he sought to show that “[e]ach theory has been
used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing
ends.” 97 His critique was so powerful that “[m]any commentators view
John Dewey's 1926 Yale Law Journal article as having put an end to the
corporate personhood debate.” 98 However, the emergence of the nexusof-contracts theory of the firm, along with cases like Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby, have left us with an extremely invigorated corporate
personhood debate. Professor Chaffee identifies three reasons for
rejecting Dewey’s call to ignore corporate personality theory:
First, avoiding complexity should not
justify failing to seek knowledge . . . .
Second, understanding the essential
nature of corporations has become
important because it impacts how these
John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 669
(1926).
97

Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1650
(2011). But see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 106 (1992) (“[J]ohn Dewey...could not,
I believe, have demonstrated successfully that each theory of corporate personality
could have equally legitimated the practices of emergent large-scale business
enterprise.”); DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION 135 (2007) (“[A]lthough theories [of the
corporation] are not determinative, from time to time and in place to place, they tend to
have certain specific associations.”).
98
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business entities can and should interact
with society. As the Supreme Court of the
United States' recent opinions in cases
such as Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
evidence, understanding the essential
nature of the corporation has never been
more important . . . . Without
understanding the nature of the corporate
form, understanding the rights of a
corporation and how it should be
regulated is impossible. Third, a better
essential theory of the corporation is
possible. 99
IV.

CORPORATE PERSONALITY THEORY & SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION

Professor Heminway notes that, “[w]hile corporate law statutory
rules may, in fact, also represent or codify norms, decisional law often
relies on theory and policy to fill gaps in meaning.” 100 Therefore,
“theory and policy may ‘push’ the law in individual settings one way or
another when the issue is perceived to be one of first impression or
otherwise creates legal uncertainty.” 101 This at least suggests a role for
corporate personality theory in resolving the issue of whether
corporations may opt out of the duty to maximize shareholder value.
While the bulk of this Essay has been devoted to examining the
foundations of the claim that private ordering to opt out of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm in corporate law is both
necessary and risky, it is hoped that the following brief suggestions
regarding ways forward can spur further inquiry and creative problem
solving.

99

Chaffee, supra note 10, at 370–71.

100

Heminway, supra note 6, at 941.

101

Id.
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Assuming shareholder wealth maximization is required by law,
which corporate personality theory best supports opting out via private
ordering? If one assumes that private citizens are granted the most
liberty vis-à-vis the state, then the aggregate and real entity theories
should provide more support for private ordering, since they align the
corporation more with private citizens than concession theory. 102
Collaboration theory is arguably more state-focused than aggregate or
real entity theory, though less than concession theory.
Thus,
characterizing the corporation as an association of individuals, be that in
the form of the shareholders or the board, should be more likely to
support private ordering. However, context matters, and thus, for
example, collaboration theory might be more supportive of opting out of
shareholder wealth maximization due to its fundamental support of
corporate social responsibility.
Of course, the protestations of the indeterminacy advocates have
weight, and one should carefully consider the particular facts of each
situation before choosing the best theory of corporate personality to rely
on in making one’s case. However, anyone in doubt of the power of
corporate personality theory in cases like this would do well to read, or
re-read, the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens United. I am not
alone in having argued that corporate personality theory had a major role
to play in the disposition of that case. 103 Imagine showing up to argue
Cf. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8–10, 64 (1990) (discussing the concession
theory and presumption in favor of regulation).
102

See, e.g., Padfield, supra note 9, at 833–34 (2013) (arguing that a close reading of
Citizens United “reveals that both the majority and dissent not only adopted diverging
theories of the corporation, but that those theories were likely dispositive,” and that
corporate personality theory “played the same silent and dispositive role” in many of
the cases leading up to Citizens United); Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC:
Stevens' Pernicious Version of the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21,
2010, 4:05 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom
/2010/01/citizens-united-v-fec-stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concessiontheory.html; cf. Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Hobby Lobby, BUS. L.
PROF BLOG (Jul. 6, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/07
103
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that case having dismissed any role for corporate personality theory as
too indeterminate, only to find the justices engaging in a heated debate
about whether the corporation is better treated as a mere association of
citizens or creature of the state, along with opposing counsel ready to
defend his or her preferred view of the firm. 104 One ignores corporate
personality theory in such cases at one’s own risk.
As an alternative to opting out of shareholder wealth
maximization, proponents of socially responsible corporate behavior
may leverage Professor Chaffee’s collaboration theory to emphasize,
perhaps by way of corporate charter or bylaw, that socially responsible
corporate behavior should only be found to violate the shareholder
wealth maximization norm when it clearly undermines shareholder
wealth. In all other situations, including where the corporate socially
responsible behavior is shareholder wealth enhancing, neutral, or has an
uncertain impact on shareholder wealth, a board may pursue the socially
responsible behavior without violating its obligation to maximize
shareholder value, and may even pre-commit to pursuing socially
responsible behavior in all these cases. 105 Thus, in both these situations
/the-role-of-corporate-personality-theory-in-hobby-lobby.html (noting that while
Justice Alito's majority opinion equated the closely held corporation with its controlling
shareholders, and thus granted the corporation standing to claim interference with its
free exercise rights, Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that the corporation could not,
as an artificial entity, exercise religion).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 33, 81, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 876
(2010), SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2008/08-205[Reargued].pdf (“JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: . . . what
you are suggesting is that the courts who created corporations as persons, gave birth to
corporations as persons, and there could be an argument made that that was the Court's
error to start with, not Austin or McConnell, but the fact that the Court imbued a
creature of State law with human characteristics”; “JUSTICE BREYER: Actually I read
that sentence that you just read as meaning the corporation is an artificial person in
respect to which the State creates many abilities and capacities, and the State is free also
to create some disabilities and capacities.”; JUSTICE STEVENS: But if there is a
compelling government -- can there be any case in which there is a different treatment
of corporations and individuals in your judgment?”).
104

I am not aware of any charter or bylaw provision setting forth such a commitment.
A October 1, 2017 Westlaw search of “EDGAR Articles of Incorporation & Bylaws”
for ("socially responsible" OR "social responsibility") in 10-Ks of Delaware
105

2017]

THE ROLE OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY THEORY

453

corporate personality theory has a role to play in determining the scope
of socially responsible behavior available to corporations. 106
V.

CONCLUSION

In this Essay, I have hopefully advanced the scholarship of both
Professors Joan Heminway and Eric Chaffee by demonstrating that the
recent shareholder wealth maximization analysis of Professor Heminway
can be viewed through the lens of Professor Chaffee’s recent work on
corporate personality theory in a way that can provide direction to
counsel dealing with issues of corporate wealth maximization and the
limits on corporate social responsibility imposed thereby. I conclude
that corporate personality theory can be useful both in debates about the
viability of opting out of shareholder wealth maximization, as well as in
providing a framework for maximizing the ability of corporations to
engage in socially responsible behavior within the shareholder wealth
maximization framework. 107

corporations with market caps of $5 million or more returned seven documents, all of
which referenced the relevant text in connection with a Corporate Social Responsibility
Committee (or similar body) under the bylaws. Of course, this was an extremely
limited search, and further efforts may be more fruitful.
Cf. How Two Rulings Are Removing Roadblocks from Impact Investing,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Feb. 18, 2016), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
edu/article/how-two-federal-rulings-are-removing-the-roadblocks-from-impactinvesting/ (“new guidance . . . reaffirms that private pension plans . . . can take social
factors into account as long as returns are not compromised . . . . [F]iduciaries may take
social impact into account as ‘tie-breakers’ when investments are otherwise equal.”).
106

Cf. John Rapley, How Economics Can Free Itself from Religious Dogmatism, EVONOMICS
(July 13, 2017), http://evonomics.com/economics-religion-dogmaticism- rapley/
(“Narratives will remain an inescapable part of the human sciences for the simple
reason that they are inescapable for humans.”).
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